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JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN PATENT CAUSES
The Preacher is not called to account for his words. He takes
refuge behind a text. With a good text he may deal fearlessly
with most delicate questions.
I have the desire to speak concerning a most delicate subject-
the subject of judicial discretion as it finds expression in the
law of patents. We may dissect or criticise the product of the
judicial mind in perfect freedom; but when we attempt to dis-
cuss the motive, the moral consciousness, back of the product we
must proceed .with caution. So it has occurred to me that, with
a good text, I might preach a sermon devoid of offense.
While my text is so old that the memory of man runneth not
to the contrary, I have no doubt that the memory of man has
taken liberties with the original pronouncement. In fact I find
myself compelled to go down into the paleozoic stratum of my
memory to find the text, which stratum of sand and silt of text-
book law was deposited during student days.
My text is: "Judicial discretion depends upon the length of
the chancellor's boot."
First, then, we come directly to the Selden Case.'
No one can read these opinions without being convinced that
Selden conceived (and disclosed in his patent application) the
generic idea of propelling a wheeled vehicle by a gas-engine.
Selden is an able patent lawyer, a son of one of the greatest
patent lawyers of a former generation, a man with Yale training;
and he drew his claims to cover clearly and absolutely all types
of gas-engine propelled wheel-carriages.'
The trial court found that, notwithstanding the fact that Selden
had coddled his application in the Patent Office for nearly the
Columbia v. Duerr, 185 Fed. 893, l07 C. C. A. 215, reversing 172
Fed. 931.
' The main claim of the Selden patent reads:
"The combination with a road locomotive, provided with suitable
running gear including a propelling wheel and steering mechanism,
of a liquid hydro-carbon gas engine of the compression type, com-
prising one or more power cylinders, a suitable liquid fuel receptacle, a
power shaft connected with and arranged to run faster than the
propelling wheel, an intermediate clutch or disconnecting device and
a suitable carriage body adapted to the conveyance of persons or
goods, substantially as described."
YALE LAW JOURNAL
17-year period which is the life-limit of a patent, he had kept
strictly within the statute, and having done so, his patent was
good. Whatever the personal feelings of the trial judge may
have been, he decided the case on the facts and the law. The
chancellorial boot was quiescent.
But by the time the case reached the appellate tribunal that
thing which we sometimes call public opinion and which, once
dynamic in the judicial mind, not infrequently becomes the high-
est type of judicial discretion, had reached a degree where it was
felt that the Selden monopoly-then a corporate monopoly-was
unmoral if not immoral. Then, too, the chancellor's boot grows
in length as it proceeds upwardly to appellate jurisdiction; and
it is well that it does and becomes a better measure.
The opinion of the trial judge in this case was masterful; why
set it at naught? From an unconscionable record filling 36
octavo volumes he had gathered the facts and applied the law in
perfect clearness; what ground was there for reversal?
It is true that Selden made application for his patent in 1879,
that he kept it in the Patent Office until 1895, and thus practically
extended his monopoly over a period of 33 years from his filing
date. And it is true that, so far as advancing the automobile
art, Selden slumbered all those years, and that in the meantime
others had reinvented the gas-engine propelled vehicle and car-
ried the art to practical ends. And when the highways had
become full of automobiles Selden set up his toll-gate.
But Selden knew, or might have known, that the Berliner tele-
phone patent application was filed in 1877, and that the Bell
Telephone Company coddled that application in the Patent Office
until about the time the generic Bell patent expired, and then, in
1891, more than fourteen years after filing, took out the Ber-
liner patent and thereby extended the Bell monopoly to cover a
period of some 33 years. He knew that the Supreme Court had
upheld this Bell monopoly.3 And who shall say that he was not
justified in thinking he might set up his toll-gate and take the
small coin of automobilist, a tax on luxuries, when the Supreme
Court permitted the Bell monopoly to tax the all-necessary tele-
phone for 33 years?
Under the hypnotic spell of Joseph H. Choate and Frederick
P. Fish the judicial discretion of the Supreme Court gave place
" United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U. S. 224, 42 L. ed. 144,
17 Sup. Ct. 809.
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to judicial literalism, and the Bell company held its unmoral
monopoly for almost double the life of the generic Bell patent.
But the years passed, and Frederick P. Fish endeavored to
cast the same spell that had worked so well some fifteen years
before in the Berliner Case. Though backed by some of the
most able counsel, the charm failed; the Circuit Court of
Appeals was not a hypnotic subject, and the Selden monopoly
fell.
How wide open the door to the Supreme Court for the exer-
cise of judicial discretion in he Berliner Case one may see from
the facts. Not only had the Berliner application been kept in
cold storage in the Patent Office over fourteen years, but it had
been "divided," and one part issued as a patent eleven years
previously; and it was also an open question whether the claims
of the final monopoly had not been injected long after two-year
public use and that, consequently, no patentable subject-matter
remained.
How narrow a crack sufficed for the Circuit Court of Appeals
in the Selden Case may also be seen. The court-do the best it
might-could not hold the patent void, but squeaked through the
narrow crack of finding non-infringement. Notwithstanding
the fact that Selden's claim called for an engine of "the com-
pression type," without any limitation to any specific type, it
was held to be limited to an external compression engine of the
Brayton type, and not to include an internal compression engine
of the Otto type, which, of course, is the type of engine employed
in all gas-engine propelled vehicles.
Now, the fact which these two cases make plain is that the
chancellor's boot has grown longer with the years; and despite
the pessimists and those judicial reformers who would establish
a sort of political spanking-machine for dealing with our judges,
it is a fact that judicial discretion has grown, in some degree at
least, in step with our industrial progress and advancement
toward a more perfect justice, to the end that our complex prob-
lems may not, by sheer complexity, get beyond the reach of the
chancellorial boot.
However one may view the facts in these two cases, the truth
remains that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Berliner
Case could be repeated to-day no more than the decision in the
Dred Scott Case. No matter if the logic of the Circuit Court
of Appeals does appear strained in the light of the cases, it
resulted in the exercise of judicial discretion which was justice
rather than academic law.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
But someone may ask, whither does this tendency lead, what
are its limits? Is not the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Mimeograph Case4 as reactionary as the Berliner Case? Let us
see.
The principles of the Mimeograph Case were settled long ago
by three great judges, one of whom became President of the
United States and another a Justice of the Supreme Court.
5 The
only reason why the rule so clearly stated in the Button Fastener
Case, supra, has been attacked in vigorous terms by a dissenting
minority of the Supreme Court is because there is a quickened
public conscience which manifested itself in judicial discretion in
the Selden Case to stop unmoral monopoly by abuse of the patent
monopoly, and which would extend that power unduly.
And here is marked the limit of the legitimate extension of
that power. I repeat that the decision of the Mimeograph Case
was sound. It was a decision upholding the plain purpose of
the statute as against popular demand for its overthrow growing
out of the abuse of the real purpose of that statute. It marks
the limit of judicial discretion. We must not make the mistake
of thinking the chancellor's boot has grown so great a power
that it may eliminate a statute because, with the passing of time
and change of condition, abuses have grown up which could not
have been foreseen by the legislative power at the time of enact-
ment. The remedy is in a revision of the statute, and not in
undue exercise of judicial discretion. The public interest in the
questions raised by the Selden Case and the Mimeograph Case
has resulted in the so-called Oldfield Bill now before the Con-
gress, which, properly considered and amended, should render
unnecessary judicial straining of fact and law, as in the Selden
Case, or the rendition of a decision in conformity to statute but
out of step with public opinion, as in the Mimeograph Case.
6
" Henry v. Dick, 224 U. S. I, 56 L. ed. 645, 32 Sup. Ct. 364.
' Heaton v. Eureka, 77 Fed. 288, 25 C. C. A. 267.
'The Oldfield Bill now before the Congress contains the following
general provisions:
First, substantially limiting the life of every patent to ig years from
the filing date and to not more than 17 years from the issue date.
Second, substantially defeating by limiting liability for infringement
the monopoly restriction in sale or use of patented articles, such as has
grown up under the Button Fastener Case, the Mimeograph Case, and
the much broader and much more questionable decision of the Supreme
Court in the Harrow Case (Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S.
70, 46 L. ed. io58, 22 Sup. Ct. 747).
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My secondly may also be illustrated by the Selden Case. It
is, of course, the rule that the courts cannot expand a patent
claim unduly7 and it is also the rule that the courts cannot dis-
regard an element positively included in the claim.8 While in
dealing with a generic invention the courts adopt a liberal view
of the claim9 they practically reverse this view in the case of a
narrow improvement.1 Sound rules like these mark the four
comers of judicial liberty and liberality upon the broad principles
that a patent is a monopoly created under statute in contravention
of common-law right and that the courts cannot rewrite a statute;
but within these four comers there is much room for the exer-
cise of judicial discretion.
With such rules as these in view let us suppose that Selden,
instead of suppressing his invention in the Patent Office, had
taken out his patent promptly, used it, and made large contribu-
tion to the automobile art. And suppose that in drawing his
claims he had included some essential element only by implica-
tion or had, without having been obliged so to do to secure his
claim, included some unimportant, non-essential feature,-it
being assumed, of course, that his drawings and specification
fully disclosed his actual invention. In such case would the Sel-
den patent have been held valid and infringed? Under the old,
strict-construction rules it is probable that the claim would have
failed; but under the broader vision of the courts"1 it is prob-
able that, in the hands of a vise chancellor, the claim would have
prevailed.
Hence the point: In judicial claim-construction literalism not
infrequently defeats the very end of justice; while the wise
exercise of judicial discretion preserves. For just as in receiv-
Third, a compulsory license provision similar to that in force many
years in several foreign countries, and which, if it had been enacted
years ago, as it should have been, would to-day relieve this country
from the German chemical monopoly which is hampering our industries
while Germany is at war.
Fourth, bringing foreign owners of United States patents under the
jurisdiction of the United States courts as to such patents, regardless of
their place of actual residence.
' Woolensak v. Sargent, 15, U. S. 221, 38 L. ed. 137, 14 Sup. Ct. 291.
'Keystone v. Phoenix, 95 U. S. 274, 24 L. ed. 344.
'Sessions v. Roniadka, 145 U. S. 29, 36 L. ed. 6o9, 12 Sup. Ct. 799.
"McCarty v. Lehigh, i6o U. S. IO, 40 L. ed. 358, 16 Sup. Ct. 240.
U See Braminer v. Schroeder, io6 Fed. 918, 46 C. C. A. 41, for an
example.
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ing a message over the telephone-where you rarely, if ever
hear every word or detail of a statement, but combine with the
word-symbols mechanically conveyed to your own apperception
of the matter,--so it is with even a written statement such as a
patent claim. You get the true meaning in the mind of the
patentee only as to the written word you add your own grasp of
the mind-content back of the written word.
Thus it becomes of the utmost importance that the judicial
mind should be unhampered either by statute drawn to invade the
domain of high moral discretion, or by arbitrary case-rule which
aims to a like end; but on the other hand, as I shall urge later,
the exercise of such wide power should be tethered by appellate
review of both fact and law,-not to defeat or limit it, but to
make certain that mistake in either fact or law has not been
made.
My thirdly is pragmatism. Judicial discretion in patent causes
not infrequently is the philosophy of William James. I have
endeavored to show by comparison of the Selden Case with
the Berliner Case that, once face to face with an unmoral situ-
ation, the literalism of a past generation gives place to the higher
morals of the law.
And I am not unaware that the critical reader may say that
what I am calling "judicial discretion" or "pragmatism" are
both wide of the dictionary. I will not argue the question
beyond this: To do equity is a generalization; to weigh a
specific situation wherein the chancellor must mete out justice
and must steer his course past statute and appellate rule and not
run amuck, wherein he must obey the statute not only in spirit
but in letter sufficiently that his decision may stand, wherein he
must construe and distinguish case-law in a manner not to con-
found precedent-all this requires the exercise of a discretion, a
vision, that is at once telescopic and microscopic, a discretion
that not infrequently involves the genius to read an old statute
in the light of new economic and industrial condition, all entirely
beyond the judicial function of hearing the plaint and reply of
two men and finding the simple equities in the case. And in no
branch of the law are these problems more frequently present or
more frequently confoundingly complex than in the law of pat-
ents. It is because a quickened public conscience demands this
judicial genius and because some judges have failed in its appli-
cation-fallen back upon the easy cushion of restful strict con-
struction of statute and application of case-that a demand for
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judicial recall and recall of judicial decision has been propounded
as a remedy-a remedy that is nothing short of amputation of
the arm of the law to cure a run-around on a judicial finger.
But to come back to my thirdly. The Congress which enacted
the basic provision of the patent statute said (§ 4886) :
"Any person who has invented or discovered any new
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof
........ may ........ obtain a patent therefor."
The italics are mine. The words "and useful" are those
which are moving our patent courts to a wiser and better dis-
pensation.
But to digress for a moment (and the preacher may do so
where the lawyer may not), it is the strange fact that, in all the
years we have had a patent office granting patents under this
specific condition-precedent statute, there has never been the
slightest obedience to the requirement that inventions must be
found useful. Patents are being granted at the rate of approxi-
mately 5oooo a year. It is notorious that not one in ten of this
vast number adds one iota to the utilities of life. Not only is it
the fact that the Patent Office pays no heed to the requirement of
utility, but it is also true that when one attempts to distinguish
an invention from a prior patent by showing that the invention is
operative and useful while the prior patent cited by the examiner
as anticipatory is wholly inoperative and consequently not useful,
he fails to make the slightest impression upon the Patent Office
intellect. This is too large a subject for consideration here. I
am merely calling attention to the fact that all these years the
Patent Office has been disobeying the statute, and that the time
must come when some leader large and strong enough to over-
come the inertia of Congress will attack this national evil and
make our Patent Office the great and beneficent institution it
should be. But to return.
Take this case: The complainant charges infringement of an
improvement patent. The defendant attacks the patent by show-
ing from the prior art that, if the complainant has taken any step
at all, his advance closely borders mere mechanical skill. He
puts the novelty of the invention clearly in doubt. Seemingly
only the prima facie of the grant can save the patent; and that
method of resuscitating a comatose patent practically ended with
the passing-on of judge Hall many years ago. The scales are at
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equilibrium. What shall turn them? The complainant shows
that his invention works, that it has gone into general, practical
use; he shows that the prior patents cited have not. He wins.
Take another case: This patent is also for a seemingly
narrow improvement. It is useful, but unlike the former case,
the prior patents also have been useful. Judged merely from
the paper showing, the novelty is put in limbo. What shall turn
the scales? The complainant shows that, instead of using any
one of prior devices which the defendant alleges to be anticipa-
tory and some of which were open to his use because the patents
had expired, he has deliberately made a Chinese copy of the
invention of complainant's patent. By such act the defendant
has confessed the utility of the invention, and by such act has
confessed a preferable utility over prior devices. Again the
complainant wins.
From the time of the Barbed Wire Case'
12 to the Collar Button
Case'18 and on down to the Rubber Tire Case
4 there has been a
growing tendency to make utility the test where the question
hangs in the balance. Slight as was the change in the Barbed
Wire Case, it turned failure into success. Simple as was the
one-piece collar button, it found large commercial use. Although
the rubber tire improvement was almost indefinable, it was exten-
sively used and extensively infringed by absolute copying.
Turning to my notes I find that, without instancing the numer-
ous cases where the trial courts have applied these rules, the
appellate courts have held commercial success the determining
factor in ten doubtful cases; in fourteen instances the efficiency
of the device turned the scale in its favor; in twenty-seven cases
extensive use has persuaded; in twenty-eight suits the proof of
prior failures sufficed; in twelve cases the courts expressed the
reason for upholding the patent as turning failure into success;
in forty-six cases the broad term utility was deemed sufficient to
cover the ruling; in seventeen cases use by defendant and in six
cases extensive litigation due to extensive infringement were
moving factors.
Of course, such rules are often urged by counsel where they
do not apply-where they are insufficient to counterbalance other
factors,--and the courts have had to make it very plain that these
143 U. S. 275, 36 L. ed. 154, 12 Sup. Ct. 443.
1148 U. S. 556, 37 L. ed. 558, 13 Sup. Ct. 719.
"4 220 U. S. 428, 55 L. ed. 527, 3, Sup. Ct. 444.
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rules cannot apply in the absence of patentable novelty, or in
cases where other factors have right of way.
However, the application of pragmatism to patents, with proper
discrimination, is becoming a ready rule by which our judges
solve every-day problems of doubtful novelty. It is a good rule,
but, like every good rule, is capable of abuse. It must not be
applied, for example, to negative novelty in a case where the
invention has failed of large use where reasons of time or circum-
stance may have prevented such use; nor must it be applied
where the commercial success has been due to extensive adver-
tising or commercial genius of the owner. I could name a
patent which has earned its owners hundreds of thousands in
the past twenty years, which has been advertised in women's
magazines, on bill-boards and in street-cars all over the land; but
which was, in fact, invented and patented in England away back
in the fifties. Here the success was due to the genius of a great
advertiser in the exploitation of a patent wholly without novelty.
But a sermon which does not depict some sin or attack some
evil is lacking in dynamics; and so in my fourthly I wish to call
attention to what I regard as a most dangerous menace to the
proper exercise and safeguarding of judicial discretion.
It is an established rule that, where a patent cause has been
tried on the law side of the court, the appellate tribunal will not
review the facts except in the case of manifest error. This is
but the application of the general and familiar rule to patent
causes; but if one goes through the patent causes tried on the
law side and reviewed on appeal, it will be found that even in
law actions the appellate courts have not hesitated to review the
facts to the end that one is forbidden to say that this rule is
absolute. It is far from absolute, even where no glaring error
has been committed at the trial; and this is as it should be.
But in patent causes tried on the equity side of the court there
have come into existence such appellate rulings as the following:
These concurring findings (of the master and the cir-
cuit court) are presumptively correct and must be per-
mitted to stand, unless some obvious error has intervened
in the application of the law, or some serious and import-
ant mistake has been made in the consideration of the
evidence.-Brown v. Lanyon, 179 Fed. 309, 1O2 C. C. A.
497 (Eighth Circuit, Judge-now Mr. Justice-Van
Devanter writing the opinion).
The testimony of the witnesses upon this issue is con-
flicting and under a familar rule the finding of the chan-
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cellor must prevail unless the defendant has succeeded in
showing from the record that he has made a mistake in
his deduction of this fact from the evidence.-Century
Electric Co. v. Westinghouse, I9I Fed. 350, 112 C. C. A.
8 (Eighth Circuit, Judge Sanborn writing the opinion).
The question of infringement being one of fact, we
might be justified in following, in the absence of manifest
error, the finding of the court below.--Krupp v. Midvale,
191 Fed. 588, 112 C. C. A. 194 (Third Circuit, Judge Buf-
fington writing the opinion).
When the chancellor has considered conflicting evidence
and made his finding and decree thereon, they must be
taken to be presumptively right; and unless an obvious
error has intervened in the application of the law, or some
serious mistake has been made in the construction of the
evidence, they must be permitted to stand.-De Laval v.
Iowa, 194 Fed. 423, 114 C. C. A. 385 (Eighth Circuit,
Judge Sanborn writing the opinion).
I have given the names of the opinion writers in these cases
to show that this rule is being expressed by most able judges;
and curiously enough, Judge Sanborn, who wrote two of these
opinions-one of our very great patent judges-also wrote the
opinion in Brammer v. Schroeder, supra, where he exercised
most wisely his chancellorial discretion.
Compare these rulings of the Third and Eighth Circuits with
the rule of the Second Circuit stated by Judge Lacombe in
Transit Development Co. v. Cheatham, 194 Fed. 963, 114 C. C.
A. 599:
When questions of fact are disposed of by the trier of
the facts in an equity suit, his decisions may be reviewed
on appeal. When disposed of by the verdict of a jury,
properly instructed, its decision on those points is not
reviewable by the appellate court.
It may be said, of course, that there is no real conflict of
decision here; that no one of these cases holds that a cause
coming up on appeal from the equity side of the court will be
denied consideration of the question whether or not manifest
error in fact has been committed. But note these facts:
First, notwithstanding the statement of Judge Buffington
above quoted that the question of infringement is one of fact,
and there is abundant authority for such statement, as a matter
of ultimate truth, in many infringement cases, it is not possible to
segregate the law and the facts.
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Second, nearly every patent cause vigorously contested and
appealed involves, in some form or other, a question of fact that
is exceedingly close and difficult of decision.
Third, with the wider, wiser, broader exercise of judicial dis-
cretion, the liability of chancellorial error in questions of fact
increases directly.
Generally speaking, a close and well-contested case reaches a
state by the time it is ready for argument where either attorney
could make a most persuasive argument on either side. The
story of General Butler is familiar. He had argued a case
before the Supreme Court, and it was clear from the assenting
nods of the Chief Justice that the court was with him. A few
days later he appeared before that court in another case wherein
he presented the same question from the other side with equal
force. The Chief Justice interrupted him with, "General But-
ler, did you not argue this identical proposition before this court
recently?" The reply was, "I had the honor." Then the Chief
Justice inquired severely, "By what show of reason, General But-
ler, can you submit the proposition in one aspect one day and in
the reverse aspect the next?" The answer was ready: "Your
Honor, because the great Supreme Court of the United States
was mistaken yesterday is ro reason why that great .court
should be mistaken to-day."
The trial judge is beset with (i) inseparable condition of law
and fact; (2) close and difficult questions of fact; (3) the
necessity of carefully-balanced exercise of judicial discretion.
Between the solution of these problems which the trial judge can
not escape and the final disposition of every patent cause in
equity by the appellate court should stand the review of both
law and fact by the appellate court; and the rule should not be
merely permissive, but mandatory.
Suppose the rule of the Third and Eighth 'Circuits, above
stated, had been applied in the Selden Case: The patent would
have been held valid and infringed, and the man who had added
no whit to the practical development of the automobile art, but
had concealed his invention in the Patent Office for years would
have taken toll from every automobile builder in the United
States who had not already paid toll; and very likely would have
wrecked more than one man who had borne the brunt of the
struggle to bring to practical use the gas-engine-propelled vehicle
of to-day. Judicial discretion-that which is higher than the
perfunctory fitting a case to the law or the law to a case-meted
out justice by reviewing the facts as well as the law.
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Hence my fourthly stands guard over my firstly, secondly and
thirdly. In the exercise of judicial discretion by the chancellor
broadened as it should be, we must repudiate with all vigor the
proposition that the appellate courts shall be relieved from review
of the facts, and insist that such review shall be mandatory in
patent causes arising on the equity side.
In conclusion, all that has been said, as is the case with most
sermons, may be summed up briefly, if only the preacher will.
In my firstly I have endeavored to show how our courts are
coming to exercise a wider and wiser discretion in patent causes
in the difficult task of disposing of an unmoral condition which
might remain unreached by legal literalism. In my secondly I
have shown how broader wisdom is coming to be applied in
claim-construction. In my thirdly I have shown how the phil-
osophy of pragmatism has come to use in turning -the scale in
the right direction in doubtful cases. In my fourthly I have
sounded a warning against a new rule which either may eventuate
in making chancellorial discretion a dangerous thing broadly
applied, or eventuate in circumscribing its exercise to the great
detriment of both inventor and manufacturer.
As the chancellor used to stand by the chancel-bar between
people and court, respected by the court and esteemed by the
people, so he should stand to-day. His powers have grown as
they should, and it is our business-we lawyers who sit just
below the chancellor-to preserve inviolate his powers.
Let us pray for deliverance from hampering statute or unwise
appellate ruling. Let us have for the chancellor and his powers
that high regard which lifts him above the laity and clothes him
with authority and distinction which, in turn, engenders in the
judicial consciousness an ideal, an impelling course of conduct,
as distinct from the greed and struggle of life as is the ideal and
conduct of the true priest of the church.
In this hour when the institutions of the Old World are being
shaken with shot and shell, the institutions of the New World
stand firm. Judicial character, judicial morality, judicial discre-
tion are of the bed-rock upon which we have builded. Let the
foundations remain strong.
Here endeth my sermon.
WAT. MACOMBER.
BUFFALO, N. Y.
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